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Abstract	
	This	Independent	Study	examines	the	relationship	between	political	satire	and	affective	polarization.	Affective	polarization	is	a	newly	growing	form	of	political	polarization	wherein	partisans	are	polarized	based	on	mutual	dislike	for	opposing	partisans	rather	than	ideological	disagreements.	Political	news	has	been	linked	to	this	recent	trend	in	polarization.		Over	the	past	two	decades,	political	scientists	have	taken	an	interest	in	investigating	the	impact	of	political	satire	programs	like	The	Daily	Show	and	The	Colbert	
Report	through	the	same	lens	as	traditional	political	news.	These	satirical	news	programs	implement	satire,	a	more	complex	form	of	comedy	that	can	require	more	cognitive	processing	and	can	produce	a	variety	of	viewing	effects.	This	projects	looks	into	how	orientation	of	The	Colbert	Report	and	partisanship	influences	one’s	affective	response	to	viewing	a	clip	from	The	Colbert	Report.	Drawing	from	past	research,	I	establish	a	dual	moderating	hypothesis	which	predicted	that	conservatives	under	the	entertainment	orientation	and	liberals	under	the	information	orientation	would	experience	higher	affective	polarization.	I	utilize	an	experimental	research	design	to	test	my	hypotheses.	Results	showed	that	liberals	did	not	experience	different	levels	of	affective	polarization	under	different	orientations,	and	that	conservatives	experienced	a	stronger	affective	response	under	the	entertainment	orientation.			
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Introduction		 On	December	18th,	2014	Stephen	Colbert	concluded	the	final	episode	of	The	Colbert	
Report	and	 thus	ended	one	of	 the	most	 influential	eras	of	political	 satire	 in	United	States	history.	Between	both	Colbert	and	fellow	late	night	Comedy	Central	host	Jon	Stewart	of	The	
Daily	Show,	political	satire	was	revitalized	and	gained	a	massive	following	amongst	American	citizens.	 While	 many	 popular	 successors	 have	 followed	 in	 the	 footsteps	 of	 Colbert	 and	Stewart,	 the	duo	have	remained	the	most	 influential	mixers	of	comedy	and	politics	 in	the	21st	century.			 Colbert	and	Stewart	format	their	respective	programs	in	a	similar	style	to	TV	news	programs;	 with	 both	 featuring	 the	 discussion	 of	 significant	 and	 newsworthy	 topics,	 but	presented	in	a	satirical	way.	This	satirical	approach	to	the	discussion	of	politics	has	existed	in	 the	American	media	 for	decades,	but	never	 to	 the	success	of	Colbert	and	Stewart.	The	popularity	and	influence	of	The	Colbert	Report	and	Daily	Show	have	called	into	question	the	legitimacy	of	these	programs	as	actual	sources	of	news	and	not	just	entertainment	programs.	The	success	of	Colbert	and	Stewart	has	led	to	a	surge	in	political	satire	programs,	like	Last	
Week	Tonight	with	John	Oliver,	Full	Frontal	with	Samantha	Bee,	and	the	new	iteration	of	The	
Daily	Show	with	Trevor	Noah,	which	have	all	achieved	great	popularity.	Political	satire	has	become	a	key	element	in	the	contemporary	relationship	between	politics	and	media,	and	has	provided	a	new	lens	through	which	the	masses	interact	with	current	political	issues,	actors	and	processes.		 If	programs	like	The	Colbert	Report	and	Daily	Show	are	to	be	regarded	as	news,	then	the	implications	of	this	classification	must	be	examined	in	depth.	Since	the	founding	days	of	the	United	States,	the	media	and	press	has	served	as	one	of,	if	not	the,	most	powerful	tools	
Skoroda	Page	7	
 for	creating	informed	citizens.	In	the	current	era,	the	news	media	has	evolved	into	a	diverse	and	often	times	controversial	organ	of	the	modern	political	sphere.	Real	news	carries	with	it	real	 impacts,	 of	which	 political	 polarization	 has	 emerged	 as	 one	 of	 the	most	 prominent.	Americans	 have	 become	 increasingly	 polarized	 over	 the	 past	 few	 decades,	 with	 this	polarization	evolving	 from	being	rooted	 in	simple	 ideological	disagreements	 to	becoming	rooted	in	negative	affect	for	opposing	partisans.	Scholars	have	pointed	to	the	increasingly	diverse	news	media	environment	as	one	of	the	potential	influencers	of	this	polarization.	This	research	project	seeks	to	understand	the	impact	that	satirical	news,	specifically	The	Colbert	
Report,	 has	 on	 affective	 polarization.	 More	 specifically,	 I	 examine	 how	 an	 individual’s	orientation	 of	 The	 Colbert	 Report	 as	 news	 or	 entertainment	 in	 combination	 with	 their	partisanship	influences	their	affective	reaction.			 	In	my	 exploration	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 exposure	 to	The	 Colbert	 Report	 on	 affective	polarization,	I	will,	 in	Chapter	1,	consult	the	established	body	of	research	behind	political	satire,	 satirical	 news,	 and	 affective	 polarization.	 Scholars	 have	 examined	 a	wide	 array	 of	elements	 and	 effects	 related	 to	 these	 programs,	 but	 have	 yet	 to	 establish	 a	 connection	between	a	viewer’s	orientation	of	satirical	news	and	its	impact	on	affective	polarization.	In	Chapter	2	I	will	utilize	this	body	of	research	to	develop	my	theory	and	form	three	hypotheses.	Chapter	 3	 will	 outline	 the	 methodology	 I	 will	 use	 in	 my	 experimental	 research	 design.	Chapter	4	will	feature	an	overview	of	my	collected	data	and	a	breakdown	of	my	statistical	analyses.	 Finally,	 Chapter	 5	 will	 involve	 a	 discussion	 of	 my	 results,	 implications	 of	 my	findings,	potential	explanations,	and	considerations	for	future	research.				 		
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Chapter	1:	Review	of	the	Literature		 My	independent	study	is	focused	on	examining	the	influence	of	satirical	news	programs	on	affective	polarization.	Recently,	scholars	of	the	press	have	taken	interest	in	examining	the	role	of	entertainment	news	programs,	labeled	as	“soft	news”,	as	a	component	of	the	American	press	and	its	influence	on	the	American	public.	In	the	current	lineup	of	soft	news	programs	that	have	been	looked	at	by	scholars,	political	satire	news	programs,	such	as	The	Daily	Show,	The	Colbert	Report,	have	gained	traction	as	legitimate	sources	of	information	and	as	powerful	influencers	on	the	American	public.	Political	satirical	new	programs,	hereby	known	as	satirical	news	(SN),	occupy	a	unique	space	in	the	media	spectrum	in	that	they	are	often	focused	on	entertainment	and	humor,	but	feature	discussion	and	elaboration	on	relevant	political	topics	that	are	mainstays	in	traditional	hard	news.		These	programs	do	not	exist	purely	to	be	funny,	McClennen	and	Maisel	(2014)	note	how	SN,	like	The	Daily	Show,	emerged	as	a	response	to	“the	mainstream	media’s	dumbing	down	of	politics”	in	favor	of	“presenting	the	public	with	information	that	was	fun,	intelligent,	and	committed	to	encouraging	critical	thinking”.	This	school	of	thought	that	SN	carries	real	sociopolitical	impact	outside	of	being	simply	entertaining	has	gained	considerable	momentum	over	the	past	two	decades.	Scholars	have	examined	the	various	facets	of	SN,	from	their	content	and	presentation	(Brewer,	2007;	Fox	et.	al,	2011;	Newman,	2010)	to	their	audiences	and	viewing	effects	(Hmielowski	et.	al,	2011;	LaMarre	et.	al,	2009;	Becker,	2014;	Baumgartner	and	Morris,	2006).	With	scholars	taking	more	note	on	the	real	world	effects	of	SN	viewership,	I	will	be	investigating	them	with	a	similar	lens	to	traditional	hard	news.			
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 Polarization	has	been	a	well	documented	aspect	of	American	politics	for	the	past	three	decades,	and	has	begun	receiving	attention	amongst	scholars	of	media.	Partisan	media	in	the	United	States	has	not	only	changed	the	landscape	of	the	American	media	environment	but	has	found	to	be	correlated	with	increasingly	polarized	public	attitudes,	especially	when	looking	at	affective	polarization.	Compared	to	the	oft-researched	ideological	and	elite	polarization,	affective	polarization	holds	that	polarization	of	the	public	is	based	more	on	mutual	dislike	rather	than	ideological	differences.		While	political	and	media	scholars	have	frequently	examined	cable	and	network	hard	news	as	influencers	on	affective	polarization	(Iyengar	and	Hahn,	2009;	Lau	et.	al,	2016;	Levendusky,	2013),	they	have	largely	ignored	the	role	political	comedy	and	SN	have	played.	SN	dual	role	as	a	source	of	entertainment	and	information	makes	it	so	that	these	programs	are	often	interpreted	and	oriented	differently	based	on	the	viewer	and	the	context	(LeMarre	et.	al,	2009;	Becker	et.	al,	2010;	Feldman,	2013;	Young,	2013)	an	aspect	of	the	programs	that	should	make	them	intriguing	targets	for	examining	their	effects.	Additionally,	SN	programs	rely	on	various	forms	of	humor,	which	have	shown	to	have	a	wide	array	of	cognitive	effects	in	media	contexts	(Polk	et.	al,	2009;	Becker,	2014;	Warner	et.	al,	2015).			The	connection	between	political	comedy	and	affective	polarization	has,	to	my	knowledge,	not	yet	been	established.	Fortunately,	there	is	an	extensive	body	of	research	on	media	effects,	affective	polarization,	political	humor,	and	SN.	This	literature	review	will	outline	the	pre-existing	research	in	the	mentioned	areas	in	order	to	establish	a	theoretical	framework	for	connecting	SN	and	affective	polarization.	First,	I	will	look	at	the	research	into	affective	polarization,	its	effects,	and	its	causal	mechanisms.	Second,	I	will	examine	the	research	behind	the	content	and	presentation	of	SN	and	their	influence	on	viewing	effects.	
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 Next	will	be	an	examination	the	the	cognitive	effects	of	satire	and	its	role	in	message	processing	and	followed	by	an	analysis	of	SN	audiences	and	their	orientation	and	perception	of	political	comedy.	Finally,	I	will	outline	my	theoretical	framework	and	hypotheses		
Affective	Polarization	and	Media	The	past	three	decades	have	seen	American	politics	become	increasingly	polarized	in	numerous	ways.	Much	of	the	scholarly	research	on	polarization	over	the	past	few	decades	has	focused	on	polarization	along	ideological	lines	and	on	the	elite	level.	Recently,	however,	there	has	been	a	surge	of	attention	placed	on	polarization	trends	at	an	affective	level.	Partisan	divides	are	being	noticed	not	only	through	policy	but	also	through	the	feelings	partisans	have	for	their	opposites.	A	recent	survey	put	out	by	the	Pew	Research	Center	found	that	fifteen	percent	of	Democratic	and	seventeen	percent	of	Republican	respondents	were	unhappy	with	the	idea	of	an	immediate	family	member	marrying	someone	of	the	opposing	party	(2014).	Compared	to	survey	results	from	the	mid-20th	century,	this	displeasure	is	far	higher	with	current	Americans	than	past	(Iyengar	et.	al,	2012).	Americans	irritation	towards	partisan	opposites	has	extended	to	numerous	facets	of	modern	day	life.	Be	it	the	way	Americans	conduct	their	spending	habits	or	choose	their	friends	or	romantic	partners,	polarization	on	an	affective	level	has	changed	the	American	social,	cultural	and	political	landscapes.		While	affective	polarization	at	a	mass	level	is	a	relatively	recent	trend	in	American	politics,	its	roots	date	back	more	than	half	a	century.	In	1960,	Campbell	et.	al	outlined	the	nature	of	partisan	identification	and	its	impact	on	political	attitudes	and	feelings.	Campbell	
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 et.	al	note	that	while	ideological	identifications	are	strong	influencers	on	partisan	choice,	affect	has	an	equal,	if	not	stronger,	effect	on	partisan	bonds	(1960).	Campbell	et	al	found	that	partisanship	is	strongly	correlated	with	parental	partisanship,	and	that	those	who	strongly	identify	with	a	political	party	are	highly	unlikely	to	break	their	partisan	bond,	even	if	the	party’s	ideology	changes.	These	findings,	despite	not	discussing	the	role	of	negative	affect,	demonstrated	the	role	affect	plays	in	partisanship	in	1956,	a	trend	that	has	continually	grown	over	the	subsequent	decades.		Based	off	Campbell	et.	al’s	findings,	political	scientists	have	emphasized	the	role	affect	plays	in	not	only	partisan	identification,	but	on	the	actions	and	attitudes	towards	partisan	opposites.	From	these	explorations,	researchers	have	isolated	the	importance	of	social	identity,	social	distance,	and	tribalism	in	determining	modern	partisan	attitudes	(Iyengar	and	Westwood,	2015;	Mason,	2014;	Mason,	2013;	Iyengar	et	al,	2012).	The	blending	of	one’s	political	identity	and	social	identity	has	dramatically	increased	in	the	past	two	decades,	resulting	in	an	electorate	that	has	shown	to	be	aggressively	hostile	against	itself	despite	holding	similar	ideological	positions	on	issues	(Mason,	2014;	Mason,	2013).		There	is,	however,	disagreement	over	the	role	of	ideology	in	explaining	affective	polarization	(Webster	and	Abramowitz,	2017;	Rogowski	and	Sutherland,	2016).	In	the	context	of	evaluations	of	candidates	and	officeholders,	Rogowski	and	Sutherland	argue	that	“Citizens	form	affective	evaluations	on	the	basis	of	their	ideological	positions”	(2016:	504).	Further,	Webster	and	Abramowitz	show	evidence	of	affective	polarization	spurned	through	polarized	ideological	thinking	in	the	realm	of	social	welfare.	These	disagreements	over	the	nature	of	affective	polarization	suggest	that	within	specific	areas	of	politics,	such	as	social	welfare	policy,	ideology	can	play	a	major	role	in	explaining	polarized	attitudes	and	feelings.	
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 Nonetheless,	there	is	great	amount	of	evidence	and	support	for	affect	as	an	explanation	for	mass	polarization,	especially	within	the	press.			Partisan	media	outlines	have	grown	rapidly	over	the	past	two	decades,	and	have	subsequently	taken	ahold	of	American	cable	news.	This	rise	in	popularity	of	these	partisan	news	programs	has	accompanied	the	rise	of	political	polarization,	causing	scholars	to	look	more	closely	at	the	effects	of	and	motivations	for	watching	partisan	media.		In	the	subsequent	examinations	of	affective	polarization,	scholars	have	repeatedly	pointed	to	increasingly	diverse	and	partisan	media	environment	as	a	casual	mechanism	(Iyengar	and	Hahn,	2009;	Lau	et.	al,	2016;	Levendusky,	2013).	Media	consumers	now	have	more	choice	than	ever	as	to	how	and	from	whom	they	are	able	to	receive	information.	This	phenomenon	of	selective	exposure	has	been	well	documented	among	scholars	(Lau	et.	al,	2016;	Iyengar	et.	al,	2012;	Stroud,	2010)	with	heavy	emphasis	being	placed	on	how	viewing	politically	like	minded	media	outlets	influences	polarization	(Levedusky,	2013).			Unsurprisingly,	partisan	media	is	most	watched	by	like-minded	viewers	on	both	sides	of	the	spectrum.	In	looking	at	the	effects	of	partisan	media,	Levendusky	found	that	viewing	like-minded	media	reinforced	attitudes	and	resulted	in	the	viewer	becoming	more	extreme,	with	these	effects	lasting	several	days	(2013).	Reinforcing	one’s	political	beliefs	provides	validation	for	their	worldview,	thus	causing	them	to	more	strongly	hold	onto	their	beliefs.	It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	these	effects	are	not	significantly	present	amongst	moderate	viewers	of	partisan	media.	Nonetheless,	the	ability	for	partisans	to	engage	in	selective	exposure	has	allowed	them	to	exclusively	view	content	that	supports	their	worldview	and,	oftentimes,	attacks	their	opponents,	thus	helping	to	facilitate	affective	polarization.		
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 Building	off	the	research	that	has	focused	on	the	effects	of	viewing	like-minded	partisan	media,	scholars	have	looked	at	the	effects	of	viewing	opposite-minded	partisan	media	and	have	found	just	as	interesting	results.	Exposure	to	information	that	contradicts	or	directly	attacks	one’s	worldview	and	beliefs	has	shown	to	potentially	create	a	response	within	the	viewer	that	causes	them	to	latch	on	to	their	beliefs	even	more.	This	phenomena,	known	as	“The	Backfire	Effect”,	is	still	questioned	amongst	scholars,	but	has	contributed	to	the	overall	body	of	research	behind	the	challenging	of	personal	opinions	(Nyhan	and	Reifler,	2010).	The	effects	of	viewing	opposite-minded	media,	sometimes	referred	to	as	crosscutting	media,	are	not	as	strong	or	pronounced	as	the	effects	of	viewing	like-minded	media	(Levendusky,	2013).	This	lack	of	impact	stems	mostly	from	the	findings	that	exposure	to	crosscutting	media	leads	to	viewers	disregarding	any	information	that	challenges	their	worldview	and	subsequently	discounting	the	source	of	this	challenging	information.			
Political	Satire		 For	centuries,	comedy	has	played	an	important	role	in	the	relationship	between	the	political	and	public	spheres.	Comedy	has	taken	numerous	forms	in	democracies	as	a	mechanism	through	which	the	public	can	interact	with,	mock,	comment	on,	and	learn	about	political	processes.	As	Polk	et	al.	state,	humor	has	a	storied	history	as	a	mean	“for	persuasion,	to	make	stories	more	captivating,	sources	more	likeable,	or	arguments	more	effective”	(203).	As	one	of	the	primary	modern	purveyors	of	political	comedy,	SN	programs	have	used	humor	as	a	powerful	tool	to	inform	their	discussions	of	political	topics.	Research	into	SN	has	often	focused	on	the	role	various	forms	of	humor	can	play	in	presenting	
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 information	in	a	satirical	way,	and	the	effects	these	various	forms	of	humor	have	on	viewers.			 Humor	types	vary	based	on	numerous	factors,	such	as	complexity,	subtlety,	context,	and	presentation	style	(Polk	et.	al,	2009).	Humor	can	manifest	itself	in	many	forms	in	SN,	the	most	prevalent	and	obvious	of	which	is	through	satire.	Caufield	notes	how	modern	political	satire	distinguishes	itself	amongst	other	forms	of	modern	political	humor	stating	that	“conventional	political	humor	is	often	geared	at	making	the	audience	laugh	at	others,	while	satire	is	designed	to	make	the	audience	laugh	at	itself	as	well	as	others”	(Caufield,	2008:	10).	The	recent	relevance	of	SN	programs	has	led	to	scholarly	focus	being	placed	on	examining	on	how	these	programs	integrate	varying	forms	of	satire	to	present	political	information.			 In	looking	at	the	properties	of	political	satire,	scholars	have	noted	how	variations	in	humor	type	and	complexity	can	result	in	different	interpretations	of	topics	in	which	the	humor	is	related	(Becker	and	Haller,	2014;	Becker,	2012;	Polk	et.	al,	2009;	LaMarre	et.	al,	2009).	Polk	et.	al’s	examination	of	SN	isolated	two	forms	of	satire,	sarcasm	and	irony,	present	in	SN	to	study	the	variation	of	effects	based	on	humor	complexity.	Viewers	who	were	exposed	to	irony	rated	the	humor	as	being	more	complex	and	had	more	difficulty	developing	counter-arguments	as	compared	to	viewers	who	were	exposed	to	sarcasm	(Polk	et.	al,	2009).	Exposure	to	different	humor	types	in	SN	can	therefore	result	in	a	variety	of	cognitive	effects	that	can	influence	not	only	the	perception	of	the	presented	content,	but	also	the	extent	to	which	the	content	impacts	the	viewer’s	personal	belief	system.			 Perceptions	of	satire	are	further	differentiated	by	the	means	through	which	the	satire	is	presented.	A	prominent	example	of	the	variation	in	satire	presentation	is	the	
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 direction	of	satirical	humor.	Self-directed	and	other-directed	hostile	humor	are	both	frequently	present	in	SN	programs,	and	have	each	shown	to	produce	vastly	different	reaction	amongst	viewers	(Becker	and	Haller,	2014;	Becker,	2012).		When	humor	is	self-directed	it	is	consequently	appreciated	more	by	viewers,	and	the	self-director	of	the	humor	is	perceived	more	favorably.	Other-directed	hostile	humor,	however,	is	appreciated	much	less	by	viewers,	with	the	target	of	the	other-directed	humor	not	experiencing	significant	unfavorable	evaluations	(Becker	and	Haller,	2014;	Becker,	2012).		Looking	more	specifically	at	the	incorporation	of	unique	forms	of	satire	in	SN	programs,	more	wide	reaching	effects	of	satire	can	be	observed.	Satire	has	the	ability	to	make	it	so	that	the	information	presented	during	the	programs	can	appear	as	ambiguous	and,	therefore,	can	be	interpreted	differently	(LaMarre	et.	al,	2009;	Becker,	2012).	Stephen	Colbert’s	The	Colbert	Report	provided	one	of	the	best	examples	of	examining	ambiguous	messages	in	political	humor.	On	The	Colbert	Report,	Colbert	portrays	himself	as	exaggerated	parody	version	of	a	right	wing	pundit	who	relies	heavily	on	utilizing	a	unique	style	of	deadpan	satire.	This	ambiguity	was	noted	by	LaMarre	et	al.	(2009)	as	eliciting	varied	interpretation	of	Colbert	by	viewers	based	on	ideology.	Ideological	conservative	viewed	Colbert	as	being	a	conservative	making	fun	of	liberals,	whereas	ideological	liberal	viewed	Colbert	as	being	liberal	and	making	fun	of	conservatives.		Colbert’s	style	of	presentation	appealed	to	both	conservative	and	liberal	viewers,	a	phenomenon	that	has	not	been	noted	in	other	SN	programs.	LaMarre	et	al	pointed	to	the	importance	of	biased	information	processing	in	influencing	these	results	(2009:	214).	To	viewers,	Colbert’s	intentions,	besides	being	entertaining,	are	ambiguous.	This	ambiguity	resulted	in	a	confirmation	bias	effect	taking	place	wherein	ambiguous	information	is	
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 processed	by	the	receiver	in	a	way	that	favors	their	own	beliefs	(2009).	Furthermore,	the	satire	in	The	Colbert	Report	could	be	regarded	as	both	self-directed	and	other-directed	and	was	thus	able	to	elicit	added	mixed	effects.		The	interpretation	of	extreme	forms	of	satire,	such	as	with	the	case	of	Colbert,	requires	more	judgment	and	information	processing	based	on	prior	knowledge	than	traditional	forms	of	political	humor	(Grey	et.	al,	2009;	LaMarre	et.	al,	2009;	Caufield,	2008).	Satire	is	oftentimes	a	critique	as	much	as	it	is	a	form	of	entertainment.	As	a	result,	the	presence	of	humor	in	satire	can	be	interpreted	differently	based	on	not	only	the	recipient	of	the	satire	but	the	target	and	source	of	the	satire	as	well.		This	divisiveness	in	the	interpretation	of	satire	has	put	this	distinctive	form	of	comedy	in	the	spotlight	of	the	media	viewing	public.	Satire	forces	its	audience	to	pay	attention,	and,	subsequently,	influences	their	perception.	McClennen	and	Maisel	identify	this	ability	to	effect	public	opinion	as	being	the	result	of	“heightened	distrust	in	mainstream	news	media,	pervasive	public	exposure	to	professional	satirical	comedy,	and	the	interaction	between	professional	and	citizen-satire”	(McClennen	and	Maisel,	2014:	11).	Satire’s	increasing	influence	on	the	public	has	inspired	both	appreciation	and	concern	amongst	scholars	of	media	and	public	opinion	(McClennen	and	Maisel,	2014;	Dagnes,	2012;	LaMarre	et.	al,	2009).	Like	LaMarre	et.	al	demonstrated	with	The	Colbert	Report,	satire	can	lead	to	misinterpretations	of	the	sincerity	and	meaning	of	messages.	The	inherent	entertaining	value	of	satire	has	also	made	it	so	that	messages	presented	in	a	satirical	way	can	be	disregarded	(Brewer	and	Cao,	2008;	Prior,	2005).	Nonetheless,	Satire	provides	an	alternative	to	the	straightforward	style	of	traditional	news,	and	sheds	new	light	on	pressing	issues	in	a	more	entertaining	way.		
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News	or	Entertainment?	Among	the	most	heavily	studied	aspect	of	SN	programs	is	the	role	they	play	as	a	legitimate	source	of	news	and	information	in	the	increasingly	diverse	media	environment.		The	classification	of	SN	programs	as	soft	has	given	the	impression	of	these	programs	being	primarily	oriented	as	entertaining	and	as	not	having	much	informative	substance.	In	contrast	to	this	soft	classification,	there	has	been	a	trend	towards	examining	effects	of	SN	that	extend	beyond	just	being	entertaining.	In	order	to	understand	the	role	of	SN	as	an	informative	source,	researchers	have	looked	at	and	compared	the	information	that	SN	sources	present	to	the	information	in	mainstream	news	broadcasts	(Fox	et.	al,	2011;	Brewer,	2007).	In	these	examinations,	it	has	been	found	that	the	majority	of	news	stories	on	SN	programs,	specifically	The	Daily	Show,	are	political	(Brewer,	2007),	and	that	content	on	The	Daily	Show	is	equally	as	substantive	as	content	on	network	news	(Fox	et	al,	2011).	The	content	of	SN,	much	like	traditional	news,	can	vary	widely	based	on	current	events	and	context,	but	largely	remains	in	a	political	context.		In	addition	to	the	substance	of	SN	programs,	researchers	have	also	looked	at	the	way	in	which	the	presentation	style	of	these	programs	influences	their	role	as	an	informative	source.	Since	SN	are	not	bound	by	traditional	journalistic	practices	and	formats,	the	content	presentation	on	these	shows	can	vary	wildly.	One	trend	that	has	been	focused	on	has	been	the	way	that	SN	utilizes	“meta-coverage”	to	report	on	current	events.	Compared	to	a	straightforward	reporting	style	of	a	standard	news	broadcast	where	information	is	presented	based	on	the	events	that	occur,	meta-coverage	involves	“the	coverage	of	the	media	coverage”	in	addition	to	reporting	on	the	events	themselves	(Newman,	2010;	Esser	and	D’Angelo,	2003).	This	technique	of	reporting	allows	the	
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 audience	of	SN	programs	to	observe	the	various	ways	events	are	discussed	across	the	media	spectrum,	and	as	Newman	suggests	“may	be	able	to	bring	political	manipulation	and	media	compliance	to	the	forefront	of	public	discourse”	(Newman,	2010:	13).		The	popularity	and	impact	of	SN	programs	doesn’t	stem	simply	from	the	content	and	presentation	of	their	respective	programs,	although	both	play	influential	roles.	Research	has	noted	that	what	made	The	Daily	Show	and	Colbert	Report	so	popular	is	the	way	in	which	these	programs	interact	with	their	audiences.	Colbert,	especially,	gained	traction	through	his	campaigns	and	initiatives	that	encourage	viewer	interaction	as	a	member	of	the	“Colbert	Nation”.	Media	scholar	Sam	Ford	observed	that	“these	initiatives	demonstrate	a	type	of	activism	similar	to	grassroots	political	campaigns,	but	operating	through	the	elements	and	aesthetics	of	online	fandom”	(Ford,	2010:	81).	Ford	also	notes	how	the	programs	exist	outside	the	mainstream	media,	and	how	this	facet	combined	with	the	audience	outreach	has	created	a	cult-TV-like	fanbase	around	the	programs.	(Ford,	2010).	Having	such	dedicated	and	active	fanbases	has	allowed	The	Colbert	Report	and	Daily	
Show	to	become	not	only	a	news	and	entertainment	experience,	but	a	social	experience	as	well.			 As	a	result	of	having	such	a	distinctive	style	of	presentation	and	audience	interaction	in	combination	with	relevant	and	substantive	political	content,	SN	programs	have	shown	to	have	a	wide	array	of	effects	on	their	audiences	based	on	various	unique	components	of	the	programs.	For	instance,	during	campaign	season,	US	citizens	turn	to	a	variety	of	sources	in	order	to	make	evaluations	on	candidates.	As	purveyors	of	political	information,	SN	programs	frequently	feature	coverage	of	campaigns	and	do	so	in	a	manner	that	breaks	the	mold	from	traditional	news	programs.	
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 	In	looking	at	how	political	comedy	influenced	viewers	during	campaign	season,	Parkin	found	that	Candidate	appearances	on	late	night	comedy	shows,	like	The	Tonight	
Show	or	The	Late	Show,	led	to	politically	disinterested	viewers	becoming	more	interested	and	engaged	in	politics	(Parkin,	2010).	However,	these	positive	effects	didn’t	carry	over	to	SN	shows	that	feature	discussions	of	political	candidates.	Baumgartner	and	Morris	discovered	that	any	coverage	or	featuring	of	political	candidates,	regardless	of	party,	on	
The	Daily	Show	led	to	more	negative	evaluations	of	said	candidates	and	increased	overall	political	cynicism	(Baumgartner	and	Morris,	2006).		These	contrasting	results	suggest	two	outcomes.	First,	political	candidate	appearances	and	discussion	in	programs	that	employ	political	comedy	do	not	have	a	standard	effect	on	viewers.	Second,	that	there	is	a	difference	in	effects	between	SN	shows	and	late	night	comedy	talk	shows	that	infrequently	discuss	politics.		While	research	has,	without	question,	demonstrated	that	SN	programs	do	produce	effects	on	their	audience,	there	is	still	debate	over	the	extent	of	these	effects	and	to	what	extent	they	influence	their	audiences.	Amongst	youth	viewers,	the	key	demographic	for	SN,	researchers	have	examined	how	these	programs	can	serve	as	a	gateway	tool	for	teaching	and	engaging	youths	in	politics.	In	the	context	of	an	introductory	level	US/National	Politics	course,	Beavers	looks	at	the	potential	of	using	political	comedy	to	teach	youths	about	politics	and	found	that	a	majority	of	students	reported	being	more	interested	in	politics	as	a	result	of	exposure	to	The	Daily	Show	and	The	Colbert	Report	(2011).	As	previously	mentioned,	however,	Baumgartner	and	Morris	posited	that	viewership	of	The	Daily	Show	during	election	season	resulted	in	increased	cynicism	towards	political	institutions	and	leaders	and	lowered	political	interest	amongst	already	youth	viewers	(Baumgartner	and	
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 Morris,	2006).	These	contrasting	findings	imply	that	SN	effects	on	political	interest	can	be	conditional	on	the	content	and	context	of	exposure.	Whereas	both	research	designs	involved	exposing	students	in	an	introductory	US/National	political	science	course	to	political	satire,	the	content	and	context	of	the	clips	shown	were	different.	Unlike	Beavers,	who	exposed	participants	to	a	variety	of	clips,	Baumgartner	and	Morris	only	showed	clips	featuring	discussions	of	presidential	candidates	in	generally	negative	contexts.			In	addition	to	judging	satirical	news’	impact	on	political	interest,	research	has	also	examined	their	role	in	facilitating	learning.	Seeing	as	SN	programs	do	contain	substantive	content	and	factual	discussion	of	relevant	political	issues,	researchers	have	looked	at	how	viewership	of	SN	impact	learning	in	comparison	to	traditional	news.	Baum	posited	that	SN	allows	politically	inattentive	viewers,	who	would	not	otherwise	view	traditional	news,	to	better	engage	with	and	learn	about	complex	issues	(Baum,	2003).	Based	off	of	Baum’s	findings,	researchers	have	subsequently	examined	SN’	impact	on	learning	in	the	framework	of	specific,	and	often	contentious,	issue	areas.	For	instance,	Stephen	Colbert’s	Super	PAC	segment	on	The	Colbert	Report	is	one	of	the	most	examined	examples	of	how	SN	exposure	can	aid	in	issue	knowledge,	and	opinion	formation	(Hardy	et.	al,	2014;	Warner	et.	al,	2015).	Warner	et.	al	demonstrated	that	exposure	to	the	Colbert	Super	PAC	increased	short	term	issue	recall	more	than	traditional	hard	news	and	was	influential	in	priming	viewers	for	further	exposure	to	campaign	finance	issues	(Warner	et.	al,	2015).	Further,	Hardy	et.	al	found	that	not	only	did	Colbert	increase	viewers	perception	of	knowledge	about	super	PAC’s	and	501(c)(4)	groups,	but	increased	their	actual	knowledge	as	well	(Hardy	et.	al,	2014).		
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 It	is	clear	from	the	body	of	research	that	it	is	unreasonable	to	ignore	the	impact	that	SN	has	had	on	politics,	media	and	the	public.	SN	programs	offer	a	new	and	entertaining	way	for	which	important	political	information	can	be	presented	to	the	public	without	sacrificing	important	details.	These	programs	have	shown	an	ability	to	not	only	influence	how	viewers	learn	about	political	issues	and	topics,	but	also	how	they	process	and	feel	about	them.				
Satirical	News	Audiences		 Why	is	it	that	audiences	have	been	progressively	turning	their	attention	more	towards	SN	programs	and	political	comedy	for	their	news	rather	than	traditional	mainstream	news	programs?	A	handful	of	researchers	have	focused	on	this	question	over	the	past	decade,	and	have	subsequently	made	progress	in	understanding	the	evolving	media	habits	of	the	American	public.	As	previously	mentioned,	the	increasingly	diverse	media	environment	has	resulted	in	new	classifications	for	media	types,	of	which	the	distinguishing	between	soft	and	hard	news	emerged.	This	diverse	environment	has	give	the	public	the	ability	to	choose	between	entertaining	and	informative	media,	and	has	thus	altered	the	ways	in	which	the	public	interacts	with	and	learns	about	political	processes,	issues	and	actions	through	media	outlets.		In	probing	the	effects	of	media	choice,	Prior	(2005)	posited	that	content	preference	is	a	strong	predictor	of	political	knowledge	and	turnout	as	media	choice	increases	and	found	that	those	with	a	preference	for	entertainment,	once	they	gain	access	to	new	media,	became	less	knowledgeable	about	politics	and	were	less	likely	to	vote.	As	purveyors	of	both	entertainment	and	information,	SN	programs	can	be	oriented	in	various	ways	by	their	audiences.	Feldman	examined	how	the	orientation	of	SN	impacts	a	viewers	motivated	
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 processing	of	the	information	presented,	and	established	that	the	orienting	of	The	Daily	
Show	as	news,	or	as	a	mixture	of	news	and	entertainment,	resulted	in	an	increase	in	the	amount	of	invested	mental	effort	(AIME)	that	subsequently	led	to	these	viewers	learning	more.	The	orientation	of	The	Daily	Show	as	purely	entertainment,	however,	resulted	in	low	AIME	and	little	to	no	learning.	Additionally,	Feldman	found	that	viewers	who	were	directed	to	orient	The	Daily	Show	as	either	News	or	Entertainment,	demonstrated	the	same	viewing	effects	to	those	who	viewed	the	program	under	their	inherent	orientation	(2013).		Looking	more	specifically	at	how	a	preference	for	SN	exposure	is	formed,	scholars	have	noted	the	factors	that	influence	a	viewer’s	penchant	for	orienting	the	programs	as	entertaining	or	informative,	and	have	developed	scales	to	measure	this	preference	in	order	to	predict	future	exposure.		Young	isolated	a	variety	of	youth	motivations	for	watching	SN,	such	as	for	fun	and	entertainment,	for	learning,	to	make	news	fun,	and	for	context	and	background	on	relevant	issues	and	events.	While	these	results	confirmed	previous	beliefs	that	youths	were	drawn	to	The	Daily	Show	and	Colbert	Report	because	the	programs	are	humorous	and	informative,	they	also	shed	new	light	on	the	youth	perception	of	these	programs	as	legitimate,	honest,	and	trustworthy	sources	of	news.		Of	all	the	motivating	factors	people	have	for	viewing	SN	programs,	the	one	that	is	most	consistent	across	viewing	groups	is,	unsurprisingly,	humor	and	entertainment	(Young,	2013;	Beavers;	2011;	Hmielowski	et,	al,	2011;	LaMarre	et.	al,	2009).	Across	the	media	spectrum,	humor	provides	a	sort	of	cognitive	reward	for	viewers,	engaging	viewers	and	attracting	new	ones.	However,	political	satire,	as	previously	discussed,	is	a	unique	form	of	humor	in	it’s	own	that	can	be	interpreted	and	enjoyed	in	vastly	different	ways.	In	order	to	predict	the	consumption	of	satire,	Hmielowski	et	al	developed	the	affinity	for	political	
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 humor	(AFPH)	scale,	which,	drawing	on	past	research,	identified	four	dimensions	of	one’s	AFPH:	“(1)	pointing	out	or	highlighting	incongruent	information	(2)	humor	contributing	to	a	sense	of	superiority	(3)	the	use	of	humor	to	relieve	stress	or	anxiety,	and	(4)	the	ability	of	humor	to	facilitate	interpersonal	relationships”	(2011:	101).	Hmielowski	et	al’s	results	from	testing	the	AFPH	demonstrated	the	scale	as	being	a	strong	predictor	of	exposure	to	SN,	and	established	social	factors	as	being	influential	moderators	for	viewership.		When	looking	at	the	motivations	one	has	for	watching	a	program,	it’s	also	important	to	consider	the	reasons	one	would	for	avoiding	said	program.	In	addition	to	identifying	motivation	factors,	Young	also	demonstrated	a	drawback	of	SN	programs	as	being	that	they	avoided	by	people	low	in	political	knowledge	who	have	trouble	understanding	the	content	and	interpreting	the	satire	(2013).	Perceived	bias	has	additionally	shown	to	be	another	strong	indicator	of	SN	avoidance.	When	bias	is	perceived	in	a	news	program,	the	content	is	often	disregarded	and	given	less	credibility.	In	an	analysis	of	cable	news	viewership,	it	was	found	that	perceptions	of	bias	were	consistent	along	partisan	lines,	with	both	conservatives	and	liberals	rating	news	programs	that	challenged	their	views	as	being	biased.	Interestingly	enough,	The	Daily	Show	was	rated	by	both	sides	of	the	political	spectrum	as	being	more	biased	than	Fox	News	and	CNN.	Coe	et.	al	suggested	that	this	finding	was	reflective	of	the	viewer	expectation	for	SN	programs	to	contain	less	neutrality	in	the	discussion	of	political	matters	(2008).			 The	body	of	research	on	audience	perceptions	of,	and	motivation	for	watching	SN	validates	the	uniqueness	of	these	programs	within	the	broad	media	spectrum.	SN	provides	various	avenues	through	which	audiences	can	learn,	laugh,	and/or	think	differently	about	
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 political	issues	and	processes.	The	ability	for	audiences	to	decide	how	to	justify	and	orient	their	viewership	of	SN	makes	these	programs	an	extremely	enticing	subject	for	research.																							
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Chapter	2:	Theoretical	Framework			 This	literature	review	has	examined	the	effects	of	satirical	news	viewership,	the	utilization	and	complexities	of	satire,	the	orientation	and	perception	of	satirical	news,	and	the	role	of	media	in	facilitating	affective	polarization.		Despite	a	great	depth	of	research	into	satirical	news	and	media	effects,	there	has	not	yet	been	an	attempt	to	establish	a	connection	between	satirical	news	viewership	and	affective	polarization.	My	research	project	will	contribute	to	the	overall	body	of	research	by	asking:	How	does	orientated	
viewership	of	The	Colbert	Report	influence	affective	polarization?			 SN	programs	can	be	perceived	in	various	ways	due	to	their	use	of	satire,	which	requires	the	use	of	more	mental	effort,	in	combination	with	their	substantive	and	timely	political	content.	Like	traditional	news	shows,	SN	programs	can	be	used	as	sources	for	information	by	some	viewers,	but	other	viewers	may	have	different	goals	and	motivation	for	SN	exposure,	which	subsequently	influences	viewing	effects.		Feldman	demonstrated	the	difference	in	viewing	effects	and	AIME	in	SN	based	on	viewer	orientation	of	the	programs	as	news,	entertainment	or	a	mix	of	both;	and	that	these	orientations	can	be	predicted	based	on	partisan	affiliation.	Additional	research	has	pointed	out	further	factors	that	help	to	predict	and	explain	satirical	news	exposure	and	orientation,	such	as	the	Hmielowski	et	al’s	Affinity	for	Political	Humor	Scale	and	Young’s	isolation	of	SN	viewing	motivations	amongst	youths.	Seeing	as	this	research	is	interested	in	affective	polarization,	it’s	important	to	take	broad	partisan	media	habits	into	account.	Conservative	media	viewers	have	demonstrated	to	have	low	trust	in	most	media	bodies,	and	thus	typically	refrain	from	receiving	news	from	a	variety	of	sources.	Liberals	display	the	
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 opposite	habits,	trusting	in	more	media	sources	and	thus	consuming	more.	Using	these	findings	on	SN	exposure	and	partisan	media	habits,	I	form	my	first	hypotheses:		H1:		Ideologically	liberal	viewers	of	satirical	news	will	be	more	likely	than	
conservatives	to	orient	The	Colbert	Report	as	informative	and	as	more	credible	pre-
exposure		 H1a:		Ideologically	liberal	and	young	(18-25	y/o)	viewers	will	be	more	likely	than	
conservatives	and	older	viewers	to	orient	The	Colbert	Report	as	informative	and	as	
more	credible	pre-exposure		The	orientation	of	a	program	pre-exposure	is	expected	to	influence	a	viewers	AIME	and	motivated	processing	when	watching	a	satirical	news	programs.	However,	the	content	of	the	program	itself	has	shown	to	be	just	as	influential	on	the	viewing	effects	of	SN	programs,	especially	based	on	the	partisanship	of	the	viewer.	LaMarre	et.	al	found	that	partisan	affiliation	influenced	how	The	Colbert	Report	was	interpreted	by	viewers.	As	mentioned	previously,	The	Colbert	Report	utilizes	a	unique	form	of	satire	that	makes	the	content	and	presentation	of	information	more	ambiguous	to	viewers.	Both	liberals	and	conservatives	viewed	Colbert	as	supporting	their	respective	ideologies	despite	Colbert’s	intentions	of	mocking	right-wing	pundits.	LaMarre	et	al	noted	that	participants	were	not	directed	to	watch	The	Colbert	Report	with	any	entertainment	or	information	learning	goal,	but	that	most	participants	presumably	watched	the	clip	for	entertainment	purposes.		Despite	Colbert’s	ambiguous	satire	requiring	more	AIME	in	order	to	understand	his	intentions,	both	conservative	and	liberal	participants	found	him	to	be	funny	and	entertaining.			 By	viewing	Colbert	as	supporting	their	respective	ideologies	in	an	entertainment	or	information-oriented	mindset,	it	can	be	hypothesized	that	conservatives	and	liberals	will	experience	similar	effects	attune	to	those	of	like-minded	media	exposure.	The	literature	on	affective	polarization	and	media	habits	demonstrates	that	viewing	like	minded	partisan	
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 media	can	produce	negative	affect	amongst	viewers	(Levendusky,	2013).	Iyengar	et	al	also	demonstrated	that	viewing	media	which	negatively	portrays	opposing	partisans,	in	the	case	of	their	study	this	media	was	negative	campaign	ads,	resulted	in	a	negative	affective	response	(2012).	Furthermore,	Colbert	often	uses	meta-coverage	in	his	segments	to	provide	context	on	ongoing	partisan	debates.	This	meta-coverage	draws	from	partisan	news	channels	like	Fox	News	or	MSNBC,	to	provide	insight	on	how	either	conservatives	or	liberal	pundits	are	discussing	oftentimes	controversial	political	topics.	The	use	of	these	clips	may	in	fact	add	onto	a	viewers	experiencing	of	like-minded	media	effects	if	the	clips	are	presented	without	Colbert	explicitly	contradicting	their	content.		Colbert’s	persona	on	The	Colbert	Report	is	interpreted,	based	on	partisanship,	as	either	a	support	or	mockery	of	right	wing	pundits	and	conservative	ideologies.	Drawing	from	my	previous	hypotheses,	Feldman’s	findings	on	how	orientated	viewing	affects	AIME,	and	LaMarre’s	findings	on	biased	partisan	processing	of	The	Colbert	Report,	I	expect	both	partisanship	and	viewer	orientation	of	SN	to	play	a	dual	moderating	role	in	influencing	satirical	news	exposure	and	affective	polarization.			The	inaccurate	interpretation	of	Colbert	as	a	genuine	conservative,	in	combination	with	the	use	of	meta-coverage,	and	a	low	amount	of	AIME	will	result	in	Conservatives	experiencing	like-minded	media	viewing	effects	and	consequently	experiencing	negative	affect.	Thus,	my	conservative	exposure	hypothesis	is:		H2:	Conservatives	who	view	The	Colbert	Report	under	entertainment-orientation	will	
experience	increased	affective	polarization			On	the	other	side,	I	hypothesized	that	Liberal	viewers	would	be	more	likely	to	orient	the	program	as	news	and	as	informative.	Therefore,	Liberal	viewers	will	have	a	higher	AIME	and	take	Colbert’s	satire	of	right	wing	pundits	more	seriously.	By	investing	more	mental	
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 effort	and	subsequently	understanding	Colbert’s	satire,	liberal	viewers	will	experience	like-minded	media	effects	and	become	more	affectively	polarized.	Thus,	my	liberal	exposure	hypothesis	is:		H3:	Liberals	who	view	The	Colbert	Report	under	information-orientation	will	
experience	increased	affective	polarization																									
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Chapter	3:	Methodology	
	 This	Independent	Study	examines	how	oriented	viewership	of	The	Colbert	Report	influences	affective	polarization.	The	main	independent	variable	in	this	study	is	exposure	to	The	Colbert	Report	(TCR),	which	utilizes	complex	and	ambiguous	satire	that	causes	partisans	to	engage	in	a	form	of	motivated	processing	wherein	they	interpret	Colbert	as	supporting	their	respective	ideologies.	The	main	dependent	variable	in	this	study	is	affective	polarization	which	is	defined	as	polarization	rooted	in	mutual	dislike	and	hatred	of	opposing	partisans	rather	than	ideological	disagreements.	There	are	two	moderating	variables	in	this	study,	the	first	of	which	is	partisanship	and	the	second	of	which	is	orientated	viewership.	Feldman	found	that	SN	programs	can	be	oriented	as	news,	entertainment,	or	a	mixture	of	both,	and	that	the	way	SN	is	orientated	impacts	the	effects	of	the	program.						 		 Based	on	the	bodies	of	research	behind	my	variables,	I	have	developed	three	hypotheses	to	predict	the	orientation	of	The	Colbert	Report	and	the	extent	of	individual-	level	affective	polarization	amongst	liberals	and	conservatives	based	on	orientation	of	The	
Colbert	Report.	My	hypotheses	are	as	followed:		H1:		Ideologically	liberal	viewers	of	satirical	news	will	be	more	likely	than	conservatives	to	
orient	The	Colbert	Report	as	informative	and	as	more	credible	pre-exposure	
	
Independent	Variable	 • Exposure	to	TCR	
Moderating	Variables	 • Partisanship	
• Orientation	of	TCR	
Dependent	Variable	 • Affective	Polarization	
Table	3.1-	Variables	H2/H3	
Skoroda	Page	30	
 H1a:		Ideologically	liberal	and	young	(18-25	y/o)	viewers	will	be	more	likely	than	
conservatives	and	older	viewers	to	orient	The	Colbert	Report	as	informative	and	as	more	
credible	pre-exposure		H2:	Conservatives	who	view	The	Colbert	Report	under	entertainment-orientation	will	
experience	increased	affective	polarization			H3:	Liberals	who	view	The	Colbert	Report	under	information-orientation	will	experience	
increased	affective	polarization			
Table	3.2:	Hypotheses	H2/H3	 					
Experimental	Design	
	 In	order	to	test	these	hypotheses,	this	study	will	implement	an	experimental	research	design.	When	studying	media	effects	and	public	behavior,	such	as	with	my	Independent	Study,	experimental	research	designs	provide	one	of	the	best	methods	to	obtain	results.	Compared	to	other	research	designs,	Experimental	designs	have	high	internal	validity,	meaning	that	cause	and	effect	can	better	be	isolated	(McDermott,	2002;	Druckman	et.	al,	2006).	In	in	the	case	of	my	independent	study,	I	am	looking	to	isolate	how	orientated	viewership	of	The	Colbert	Report	causes	an	affective	polarization	effect.	Experimental	designs	also	allow	for	systemic	modifications	and	control	of	conditions	and	variables,	permitting	the	research	conductor	to	better	tailor	their	design	to	their	research	(McDermott,	2002).	Further,	experimental	designs	are	repeatable,	allowing	for	results	to	be	retried	under	different	external	conditions	in	order	to	verify	or	challenge	results	
	 Conservative	Viewer	 Liberal	Viewer	Entertainment-	Orientation		 Increased	Affective	Polarization	 Little	to	No	Affective	Response	Information-	Orientation		 Little	to	No	Affective	Response	 Increased	Affective	Polarization	
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 (Druckman,	2006).	Experimental	designs	are	therefore	the	best	means	to	draw	causal	conclusions	and,	as	a	result,	have	been	relied	upon	for	much	of	the	previous	research	into	Satirical	News	(Feldman,	2013;	LaMarre	et.	al,	2009;	Baumgartner	and	Morris,	2006)			 Despite	having	a	great	deal	of	advantages,	experimental	designs	do	have	drawbacks	that	are	worth	noting.	First,	experimental	designs	have	low	external	validity,	meaning	that	results	cannot	be	generalized	to	a	larger	population.	Experimental	designs	must	therefore	include	an	as	diverse	as	possible	test	group	in	order	to	have	more	conclusive	results.	Second,	experimental	designs	can	create	artificial	environments	that	may	interfere	with	results	(McDermott,	2002;	Druckman,	2006).	Exposure	to	TCR	in	my	design	differs	greatly	from	standard	exposure	to	TCR,	creating	a	synthetic	viewing	experience.	Additionally,	while	experimental	designs	allow	for	a	great	amount	of	control	of	variables	within	the	study	they	do	not	allow	for	the	control	of	external	variables	(McDermott,	2002).	For	my	online	survey	I	will	not	be	able	to	account	for	the	setting,	mood,	health	and	other	external	factors	that	may	influence	the	results	from	individual	participants.	In	order	to	address	this	issue,	my	design	will	draw	from	a	large	sample	to	eliminate	the	impact	that	external	variables	may	have	on	an	individual	participant.		
	
Independent	Variable	In	order	to	study	the	impact	of	SN	orientation	on	affective	polarization,	participants	in	my	research	design	must	be	exposed	to	a	SN	program,	specifically	The	Colbert	Report.	As	previously	discussed,	TCR	employs	a	unique	and	extreme	form	of	satire	that	makes	Colbert’s	messages	more	ambiguous	to	partisans.	This	study	operationalizes	ambiguous	satire	through	exposing	participants	to	a	three-minute	clip	from	TCR.	The	clip	I	have	chosen	for	exposure	involves	Colbert’s	incorporating	his	ambiguous	satire	into	a	
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 commentary	about	the	partisan	debate	on	Presidential	vacations	(comedycentral.com,	2014)	Colbert	draws	upon	segments	from	Fox	News	programs	to	contextualize	the	debate,	but	never	directly	contradicts	or	attacks	the	information	presented	by	the	right	wing	pundits.	Further,	the	controversy	presented	in	this	clip	deals	strictly	with	President	Barack	Obama,	whom	Colbert	mocks	for	“slacking	off	on	destroying	America”.	The	overall	tone	of	the	clip	fits	within	TCR’s	style	of	ambiguous	satire	that	was	observed	by	LaMarre	et	al	as	being	interpreted	by	partisans	as	promoting	their	respective	ideologies.			
Moderating	Variables		 Prior	to	their	exposure	to	the	Colbert	clip,	participants	will	be	asked	to	identify	their	partisanship	and	ideology	along	a	seven-point	scale.	The	moderating	variable	of	partisanship	is	not	manipulated	in	this	experiment	and	is	operationalized	based	on	how	participants	self-identify.	My	other	moderating	variable,	Orientation	of	TCR,	is	both	measured	and	manipulated	in	this	study.	In	the	pre-test	survey,	participants	will	be	asked	how	they	orient	TCR	based	on	a	five-point	scale	ranging	from	“Strictly	News”	to	“Strictly	Entertainment”.	After	reporting	their	orientations,	participants	will	be	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	three	pre-exposure	directives	that	serve	to	manipulate	their	viewing	of	the	clip.	These	directives	borrow	from	Feldman’s	methodology	that	sought	to	understand	how	SN	orientation	impacted	learning	and	AIME	(2013).	The	variable	is	further	manipulated	by	directing	participants	to	prepare	to	be	questioned	regarding	a	specific	orientation-related	aspect	of	the	clip	(in	this	case	either	knowledge	or	enjoyment).		The	three	directives	are	as	follows:		
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Table	3.3-	Pre-Exposure	Directives		
Following	exposure	to	the	clip	under	the	orientation-directives	participants	will	be	asked	to	answer	questions	about	the	content	of	the	program	and	to	evaluate	Colbert	as	a	presenter.	These	questions	seek	to	gauge	the	effectiveness	of	the	pre-exposure	directives	on	learning	from	and	enjoyment	of	the	clip	in	order	to	understand	the	impact	on	AIME	and	the	dependent	variable.	The	post	test	questions	are	as	followed:		
Table	3.4-	Knowledge	Test	
	
Table	3.5:	Entertainment	Evaluation	
1. Please	rate	how	entertaining	you	
found	the	clip	to	be	
	
1. Very	Entertaining		2. Mildly	Entertaining		3. Neither	Entertaining	or	Unentertaining	4. Not	very	entertaining		
5. Not	entertaining	at	all		
Entertainment	Directive	 “Please	watch	this	entertaining	clip	from	The	Colbert	Report,	
be	prepared	to	evaluate	Colbert’s	performance	after	the	clip”	
News	Directive	 “Please	watch	this	informative	clip	from	The	Colbert	Report,	
be	prepared	to	take	a	knowledge	test	after	the	clip”	
No	Directive	 “Please	watch	this	clip	from	The	Colbert	Report”	
1. Where	was	the	Obama	vacationing	
when	he	asked	an	ambassador	to	
have	a	dinner	party?		
	
1. Key	West	2. London	3. Rome	
4. Beijing	
2. What	event	does	Fox	News	critique	
Obama	for	ignoring	while	on	
Vacation?	
1. Tax	Bill	Vote		2. Supreme	Court	Ruling		3. US/Mexico	Border	Dispute	4. International	Leader	Summit	in	Europe		
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2. Please	rate	how	funny	you	found	
Stephen	Colbert	to	be	
	
	
1. Very	Funny		2. Mildly	Funny		3. Neither	Funny	or	Unfunny	4. Not	very	Funny	5. Not	Funny	at	all		
	
Dependent	Variable:			 The	dependent	variable	in	this	study—Affective	Polarization—is	measured	in	two	categories,	favorability	and	social	distance,	based	on	Iyengar	et.	al’s	operationalization’s	(2012).	Favorability	is	operationalized	through	three	“feeling	thermometers”	on	President	Obama	(“How	do	you	feel	about	the	actions	of	President	Obama?”)	The	Fox	News	Hosts	featured	in	the	Clip	(“How	do	you	feel	about	the	critique	from	Fox	News	Hosts?”),	and	Colbert	himself	(“How	do	you	feel	about	Colbert’s	coverage	of	this	debate?”).	Each	feeling	thermometer	will	involve	participants	rating	their	feeling	towards	the	three	subjects	on	a	1-100	scale.	Social	distance	is	operationalized	by	asking	participants	to	report	their	attitudes	towards	partisan	related	social	situations.	The	social	distance	measures	are	as	follows:		
Table	3.6-	Social	Distance	
	
	
	
1. I	would	be	comfortable	with	my	child	
or	a	close	family	member	marrying	
someone	from	an	opposing	political	
party?	
1. Very	Comfortable	2. Comfortable	3. Neither	Comfortable	nor	Uncomfortable	4. Uncomfortable	
5. Very	Uncomfortable	
2. When	establishing	friendships,	I	take	
into	account	the	partisanship	of	
potential	friends	
a. Strongly	Agree	b. Agree	c. Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree	d. Disagree	e. Strongly	Disagree		
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Controls		 In	order	to	control	for	outside	factors	that	may	impact	my	results,	I	asked	a	series	of	control	questions.	These	questions	borrow	from	LaMarre	et.	al’s	measures	which	ask	about	participants	Age,	Race,	Gender,	Home	State,	Income,	Education,	and	their	past	exposure	to	
The	Colbert	Report.	The	operationalization’s	of	these	measures	are	as	follows:		
Table	3.7-	Controls	
What	is	your	Race?	 1. White	2. Black	3. American	Indian	or	Alaska	Native	4. Asian	5. Native	Hawiian	or	other	Pacific	Islander	6. Other	please	specify	
	
What	is	your	Gender?		 1. Male	2. Female	3. Transgender	4. Other	5. No	answer	
What	is	your	total	household	income	
before	taxes	during	the	past	12	
months?	
1. Less	than	$25,000	2. $25,000	to	$34,999	3. $35,000	to	$49,999	4. $50,000	to	$74,999	5. $75,000	to	$99,999	6. $100,000	to	$149,999	7. $150,000	or	more	
What	is	the	highest	level	of	school	you	
have	completed	or	the	highest	degree	
you	have	Received?	
1. Less	than	High	School	2. High	school	graduate	-	high	school	diploma	or	equivalent	(for	example:	GED),	3. Some	college	but	no	degree,	Associate	degree	(for	example:	Occupational/vocational	program	or	Academic	program),	4. Bachelor’s	degree	(for	example:	BA,	AB,	BS),	5. Master’s	degree	(for	example:	MA,	MS,	MEng,	MEd,	MSW,	MBA),	
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 6. Professional	School	degree	(for	example:	MD,	DDS,	DVM,	LLB,	JD),	Doctorate	degree	(for	example:	PhD,	EdD),	7. Other,	please	specify	
What	is	your	Home	State?	 Ak-Wy	
How	old	are	you?		 Fill	in	the	Blank	
Choose	which	option	best	describes	
your	past	exposure	to	The	Colbert	
Report	or	other	Satirical	News	
programs	
1. Frequently	2. Often	3. Sometimes		4. Rarely	5. Never		
Procedure		 In	order	to	test	my	hypotheses,	this	experimental	research	design	that	will	rely	on	the	use	of	the	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk	(MTurk)	and	a	student	population	at	The	College	of	Wooster.	MTurk	is	a	“marketplace	for	work	that	requires	human	intelligence”	and	works	through	compensating	MTurk	users	for	completing	various	tasks,	which	in	the	case	of	my	Independent	Study	would	be	a	survey.	MTurk	provides	the	best	means	to	gather	a	large	and	diverse	sample	in	a	brief	amount	of	time.	The	demographics	of	a	small	liberal	arts	college,	like	the	College	of	Wooster,	are	similar	to	the	viewing	demographics	of	The	Colbert	
Report	and	should	provide	sufficient	data	directly	from	the	audience	of	TCR.			 Survey	participants	were	provided	with	a	link	to	a	Qualtrics	survey,	and	were	subsequently	shown	a	consent	form	informing	them	of	the	direct	and	indirect	benefits	of	completing	the	survey	and	that	they	may	choose	to	drop	out	at	any	time.	Further,	participants	were	informed	that	only	American	users	over	the	age	of	18	will	be	permitted	to	partake	in	the	study.	If	participants	agreed	to	the	terms	and	conditions	they	were	directed	to	the	survey.	First,	Participants	were	asked	to	complete	a	short	pre-test	survey	
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 that	collected	data	about	the	previously	mentioned	control	variables	in	addition	to	their	partisanship,	ideology	and	self-reported	orientation	of	TCR.	After	completing	the	pre-test	survey,	participants	were	asked	to	view	the	clip	from	TCR	and	were	randomly	assigned	to	view	said	clip	under	the	previously	discussed	orientation	directives.	Following	their	viewing	of	the	clip,	participants	were	asked	to	complete	a	knowledge	test,	an	evaluation	of	how	entertaining	they	found	Colbert,	and	a	test	to	measure	their	affective	polarization.	Finally,	participants	were	debriefed	and,	for	MTurk	users,	were	compensated	$0.75	upon	completion	of	the	survey.		
	
Analysis		 In	order	to	analyze	the	collected	data,	I	will	be	running	a	difference	of	means	test	across	conditions	to	see	the	differences	in	affective	polarization	based	on	orientation	and	partisanship.	Additionally,	results	from	this	difference	of	means	test	for	the	treatments	groups	will	be	compared	to	those	from	the	control	group.																				
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Chapter	4:	Results	and	Analysis		 	 In	this	chapter	I	will	first	summarize	the	results	from	my	survey,	which	measured	how	a	viewer’s	exposure	to	The	Colbert	Report	under	different	orientations	influences	their	affective	polarization.	Second,	I	will	outline	my	statistical	analysis	methods	using	SPSS	and	present	my	findings.	Finally,	I	will	discuss	the	findings	from	my	analyses	and	discuss	their	implications.	Data	analysis	and	discussion	will	be	centered	around	my	research	question	and	the	four	hypotheses	I	developed	in	my	theoretical	framework	chapter.	My	first	two	hypotheses	held	that	liberal	(H1),	and	more	specifically	young	and	liberal	(H1a),	would	be	more	likely	to	orient	TCR	as	news.	My	second	hypothesis	posited	that	conservatives	who	viewed	the	clip	under	the	entertainment	orientation	would	demonstrate	higher	affective	polarization	(H2);	while	my	third	hypothesis	posited	that	liberals	who	viewed	the	clip	under	the	information	orientation	would	demonstrate	higher	affective	polarization	(H3).	Statistical	analysis	was	done	using	SPSS.	Difference	of	means	tests	were	conducted	to	test	my	four	hypotheses	and	research	question.		
Summarization	of	Data		This	section	will	involve	a	summarization	of	my	data	collection	process,	and	an	overview	of	the	descriptive	statistics.	Through	the	MTurk	marketplace	this	research	project	was	able	to	recruit	352	MTurk	workers	who	were	provided	a	link	to	the	survey	and	were	awarded	$0.75	upon	survey	completion.	All	352	participants	viewed	the	clip	and	completed	the	survey,	but	a	technical	error	resulted	in	9	participants	not	filling	out	the	partisanship	and	ideology	pre-test	survey	questions.			
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Independent	Variable		 The	independent	variables	in	my	first	hypothesis—age	and	ideology—were	measured	in	the	pre-test	survey.	165	participants	identified	themselves	as	being	Moderately-Very	Liberal,	and	47	fell	within	the	18-25	age	demographic.	In	total,	28	participants	were	both	between	18-25	and	identified	as	moderately-very	liberal.	There	were	no	measurements	used	to	collect	info	about	the	independent	variable—exposure	to	
TCR—in	the	second	and	third	hypotheses.	Rather	all	participants	were	shown	the	same	clip	at	the	same	point	in	the	survey.			
Moderating	Variables	The	two	moderating	variables—Orientation	of	TCR	(hereby	M1)	and	Partisanship/Ideology	(hereby	M2)—for	my	second	and	third	hypotheses	were	operationalized	in	two	ways.	In	order	to	operationalize	M1	participants	were	first	asked	in	the	pre-test	survey	to	provide	their	self-reported	orientation	of	TCR	on	a	5-point	scale	ranging	from	strictly	news	to	strictly	entertainment	(Mean=3.26,	SD=0.9).	This	measure	of	orientation	was	also	used	to	operationalize	the	dependent	variable	for	the	first	hypothesis.	M1	was	further	operationalized	through	the	random	assignment	of	participants	to	either	one	of	the	two	treatment	groups,	that	received	the	information	or	entertainment	viewing	directive,	or	to	the	control	group,	which	received	no	viewing	directive.	Randomization	of	participants	to	the	pre-test	directives	were	allocated	as	follows:	107	Entertainment	Directive	(30%),	118	Information	Directive	(34%),	and	127	No	Directive	(36%).		The	operationalization	of	M2	was	done	through	asking	participants	to	self-report	their	partisanship	(Mean=4.5,	SD=1.71)	and	ideology	(Mean=4.49,	SD=1.75)	in	the	pre-test	
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 survey.	As	mentioned	previously,	9	participants	were	unable	to	respond	to	these	two	questions,	resulting	in	343	partisan	and	ideology	answers	being	collected.	For	partisanship,	89	participants	reported	as	being	Moderate	Republican-Strong	Republican,	173	reported	as	being	Moderate	Democrat-Strong	Democrat,	and	81	reported	as	Independent.	For	ideology,	splits	were	similar,	with	85	reporting	as	Moderately-Very	Conservative,	165	as	Moderately-Very	Liberal,	and	93	as	moderate.			
Dependent	Variable		 For	the	first	hypothesis,	the	previously	discussed	M1	operationalization	was	used	for	the	dependent	variable—orientation	of	The	Colbert	Report	(TCR).	The	dependent	variable—affective	polarization—for	the	second	and	third	hypotheses,	was	also	operationalized	in	two	ways,	scenario	response	and	feeling	thermometers,	following	participant	exposure	to	TCR.	For	the	scenario	responses,	participants	were	asked	two	social	distance	questions	related	to	the	impact	of	partisanship	on	friendships	and	marriages.	The	two	social	distance	questions	were	recoded	in	SPSS	into	one	standard	social	distance	affective	measure	(M=2.51,	SD=1.02)	operationalized	from	1-5,	with	5	representing	a	higher	affective	response.	For	the	feeling	thermometers,	participants	were	asked	to	rate	their	feeling	towards	the	actions	of	President	Obama	(Mean=61.47,	SD=29.4),	the	critique	from	the	Fox	News	host	(Mean=29.39,	SD=28.59),	and	the	coverage	of	the	debate	by	Colbert	(Mean=53.94,	SD=30.19).					
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Hypothesis	Testing			 In	this	section,	I	will	conduct	analyses	to	test	each	of	my	four	hypotheses.	Difference	of	means	tests	were	conducted	to	compare	my	variables	across	conditions..		H1:		Ideologically	liberal	viewers	of	satirical	news	will	be	more	likely	than	
conservatives	to	orient	The	Colbert	Report	as	informative	pre-exposure	
	Using	the	pre-test	measures,	I	compared	the	self-reported	orientation	means	between	conservative	and	liberal	ideologies.	Prior	exposure	to	SN	was	also	taken	into	account	as	an	indicator	of	familiarity	in	programs	like	TCR.		
	Results	confirmed	my	hypothesis,	and	showed	that	liberals	had	more	exposure	and	significantly	oriented	TCR	more	towards	news	than	entertainment.		H1a:		Ideologically	liberal	and	young	(18-25	y/o)	viewers	will	be	more	likely	than	
conservatives	and	older	viewers	to	orient	The	Colbert	Report	as	informative	pre-
exposure	
	Another	difference	of	means	test	was	conducted	to	test	this	hypothesis,	but	with	the	addition	of	the	age	measure.	The	exposure	to	and	orientation	of	TCR	of	participants	who	qualified	as	both	young	(18-25)	and	liberal	were	measured	against	all	other	participants.		
Table	4.1-	Liberal	Orientation/Exposure		 Ideology	 N	 Mean	 SD	 Significance	Exposure	to	The	Colbert	Report		 Con	 89	 3.08	 1.047	 	.109	Lib	 173	 2.86	 1.071	Orientation	of	The	Colbert	Report	 Con	 89	 3.51	 1.067	 	.004	Lib	 173	 3.16	 0.83	
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	Results	confirmed	my	hypothesis,	with	young	and	liberal	demonstrating	higher	levels	of	exposure	and	a	higher	news	orientation	compared	to	all	other	participants.		H2:	Conservatives	who	view	The	Colbert	Report	under	entertainment-orientation	will	
experience	increased	affective	polarization		Utilizing	the	pre-test	ideology,	randomly	assigned	viewing	directives,	and	post-test	affective	measures,	a	comparison	of	means	test	was	conducted	amongst	conservative	participants	across	the	pre-test	directive	conditions.	
Table	4.3-	Conservative	Across	Conditions	Condition	 Social	Distance	 Obama	 Fox	News		 Colbert	Ent	 Mean	 2.2656	 34.7187	 50.9062	 36.0938	N	 32	 32	 32	 32	SD	 .98361	 28.79990	 22.12043	 23.67162	Info	 Mean	 2.5517	 34.6207	 52.2069	 46.7241	N	 29	 29	 29	 29	SD	 .91948	 24.65681	 29.44411	 33.28438	Control	 Mean	 2.7500	 44.2857	 59.2143	 56.8214	N	 28	 28	 28	 28	SD	 .73912	 36.88406	 31.84146	 30.00994	Total	 Mean	 2.5112	 37.6966	 53.9438	 46.0787	N	 89	 89	 89	 89	SD	 .90446	 30.38406	 27.79362	 29.98872		Conservatives	demonstrated	unique	results	across	conditions.	An	independent	samples	t-test	was	conducted	between	the	entertainment	and	information	groups,	with	results	displaying	similar	affective	responses	and	no	significant	differences.	Significant	differences	
Table	4.2-	Young-Liberal	Orientation/Exposure		 Young-Liberal	 N	 Mean	 SD	 Significance	Exposure	to	The	Colbert	Report		 Yes	 28	 2.79	 1.031	 .227		No	 324	 3.03	 1.042	Orientation	of	The	Colbert	Report	 Yes	 28	 3.00	 .76980	 .105		No	 324	 3.29	 .91552	
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 were	most	apparent	when	comparing	responses	in	the	Control	group	to	the	Entertainment	group.		
Table	4.4-	Conservative:	Control-Entertainment		 Condition	 N	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 Significance	Colbert	Thermo	 Ent	 32	 36.0938	 23.67162	 .004	Control	 28	 56.8214	 30.00994	Social	Distance	 Ent	 32	 2.2656	 .98361	 .037	Control	 28	 2.7500	 .73912		For	both	the	Colbert	Thermometer	measure	and	the	combined	Social	Distance	measure,	Conservative	respondents	showed	significantly	higher	affective	responses	under	the	Entertainment	directive	compared	to	the	Control.	These	results	are	consistent	with	my	hypothesis	that	conservatives	would	experience	higher	affective	polarization	under	the	entertainment	orientation	condition.		H3:	Liberals	who	view	The	Colbert	Report	under	information-orientation	will	
experience	increased	affective	polarization			Using	the	same	pre-test	measure	as	the	H2	test,	another	difference	of	means	test	was	conducted	with	only	liberal	participants	across	viewing	orientation	conditions.			
Table	4.5-	Liberals	Across	Conditions	Condition	 Social	Distance	 Obama	 Fox	News		 Colbert	Ent	 Mean	 2.6700	 74.7600	 16.9800	 61.4800	N	 50	 50	 50	 50	SD	 1.09549	 23.59225	 20.01784	 25.92709	Info	 Mean	 2.7660	 77.3830	 16.7660	 59.7021	N	 47	 47	 47	 47	SD	 .98825	 18.84554	 21.37981	 29.65887	Control	 Mean	 2.8309	 77.8676	 17.0147	 60.7059	N	 68	 68	 68	 68	SD	 1.10835	 22.17562	 22.09038	 29.42081	Total	 Mean	 2.7636	 76.7879	 16.9333	 60.6545	N	 165	 165	 165	 165	
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 SD	 1.06720	 21.64846	 21.14962	 28.31372		Liberals	showed	uniform	affective	responses	across	conditions,	with	no	condition	having	any	significantly	distinct	results.	Liberals	were	expectedly	cold	towards	the	critique	by	Fox	News	featured	in	the	clip,	but	did	not	show	a	strong	affective	response	to	the	social	distance	affective	measures.		A	comparison	of	means	test	was	also	conducted	across	the	pre-test	self-reported	orientation	conditions,	with	liberals	showing	almost	identical	results.			 Results	were	not	consistent	with	my	hypothesis.	While	Liberals	showed	minor	signs	of	affective	polarization,	specifically	in	their	thermometer	rating	of	the	Fox	News	Hosts,	their	affective	responses	were	not	significantly	different	under	any	of	the	conditions,	much	less	the	information	condition.	Compared	to	Conservatives,	Liberals	showed	higher	levels	of	affective	polarization	for	the	social	distance	measures	and	the	thermometer	rating	for	the	Fox	News	coverage.	The	latter	result	was	unsurprising,	but	the	social	distance	revelation	was	not	entirely	expected.		While	the	Liberal	social	distance	affective	measure	(M=2.73,	SD=1.05)	indicated	minor	comfortability	with	the	presented	scenarios,	the	Conservative	mean	(M=2.51,	SD=0.90)	was	indicated	more	comfortability	with	the	difference	between	the	two	group	means	approaching	statistical	significance	(p=0.87).												
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Chapter	5:	Conclusion			 The	goal	of	this	research	project	is	to	understand	the	relationship	between	orientation	of	satirical	news	and	affective	polarization.	A	plethora	of	research	into	the	content,	presentation,	and	audiences	of	satirical	news,	in	addition	to	research	into	media	and	polarization	was	consulted	to	form	three	hypotheses.		These	hypotheses	were	tested	using	an	experimental	research	design	involving	a	survey	sent	out	on	the	Amazon	MTurk	marketplace.	Participants	in	the	survey	were	shown	the	same	clip	from	The	Colbert	Report	but	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	three	pre-exposure	viewing	directives	that	sought	to	prime	their	orientation	to	the	clip.	Conservatives	who	viewed	the	clip	under	the	entertainment	orientation	were	expected	to	show	higher	affective	polarization	and	liberals	who	viewed	the	clip	under	the	information	orientation,	were	hypothesized	to	show	higher	levels	of	affective	polarization.			
Discussion	of	Results			 As	hypothesized,	liberals,	and	more	so	young	liberals,	had	higher	levels	of	exposure	to	satirical	news	and	oriented	The	Colbert	Report	more	towards	news	than	entertainment.	The	primary	viewing	demographics	for	satirical	news	programs	are	younger,	more	liberal,	people,	so	these	results	are	unsurprising.	Liberals	showed	intriguing	results	in	my	analysis	of	their	affective	response	to	the	TCR	clip	under	the	three	conditions.	Liberals	were	expected	to	show	a	higher	affective	response	under	the	information	orientation,	but	ended	up	having	almost	identical	affective	responses	across	all	three	conditions.	A	potential	explanation	for	the	lack	of	variety	in	the	liberal	participants	affective	response	is	that	they	had	much	more	prior	exposure	to	TCR	and	were	not	influenced	by	the	pre-test	directives	
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 due	to	their	having	pre-conceived	orientation	of	the	program.	If	liberals	were	shown	a	clip	from	a	less	well	known	satirical	news	program,	they	may	be	more	likely	to	show	a	variety	in	affective	responses.	Another	possible	explanation	is	that,	due	to	having	higher	self-reported	past	exposure	to	TCR,	Liberals	were	aware	of	the	intention	of	Colbert’s	satire,	and	did	not	experience	similar	effects	to	those	who	saw	his	satire	as	more	ambiguous,	thus	leading	to	more	uniform	results.			 Wide	variation	in	affective	responses	was	most	apparent	amongst	conservative	participants.	Conservatives	were	expectedly	cold	towards	Obama	and	warm	towards	Fox	News,	but	thermometer	ratings	nonetheless	fluctuated	greatly	across	conditions.	The	Entertainment	and	Information	groups	demonstrated	similar,	but	not	uniform,	results	across	the	affective	measures;	however,	the	control	group	results	differed	greatly	from	the	treatment	groups.	The	most	apparent	variation	in	affective	response	was	present	in	the	thermometer	rating	of	Colbert.	As	previously	discussed,	the	entertainment	vs	control	group	comparison	of	means	test	showed	significant	a	difference	in	the	Conservative	rating	of	Colbert.	Under	no	pre-test	directive,	conservatives	rated	Colbert,	in	addition	to	Obama	and	Fox	News,	much	higher	than	Conservatives	who	were	given	the	entertainment	or	information	pre-test	directives.			 It	is	possible	that	under	any	pre-test	directive,	regardless	of	if	it	is	entertainment	or	information,	Conservatives	had	a	higher	AIME.	This	higher	level	of	AIME	resulted	in	Conservatives	correctly	interpreting	Colbert	as	mocking	conservative	pundits	and	thus	resulted	in	them	rating	him	negatively.	Conservatives	in	the	control	group	had	a	lower	AIME	and	viewed	Colbert	as	being	a	genuine	conservative	and	thus	experiences	like-minded	media	effects.	The	like-minded	media	effects	held	true	for	the	conservative	control	
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 group’s	response	to	the	social	distance	measure,	which	was	significantly	higher	compared	to	the	entertainment	and	information	groups.	These	findings	partially	support	my	hypothesis	that	conservatives	with	a	lower	AIME	will	experience	higher	affective	polarization,	but	are	also	inconsistent	because	I	hypothesized	that	the	entertainment	orientation	would	lead	to	AIME	amongst	conservatives.	Conservatives	nonetheless	demonstrated	higher	affective	polarization	under	the	entertainment	condition	in	the	thermometer	ratings	for	Obama	and	Colbert.				
Considerations		 This	research	project	provides	a	template	future	research	could	rely	upon	to	better	gauge	audience	responses	to	satirical	news.	Future	research	should	create	hypotheses	regarding	the	affective	responses	of	Independents	and	Moderates.	Independents	were	not	considered	because	they	were	not	expected	to	show	strong	affective	responses	and	did	have	direct	opposing	partisans;	however,	a	sizable	portion	of	my	research	population	self-identified	as	independent	or	moderate.	Although	they	do	not	possess	a	direct	political	opponent,	Independents/Moderates	could	still	provide	insightful	information	of	the	effects	of	exposure	to	political	satire.			Additionally,	future	research	could	utilize	different	forms	of	political	satire	to	gauge	how	responses	differ.	A	plethora	of	new	political	satire	programs	have	emerged	in	the	footsteps	of	Colbert	and	Jon	Stewart	that	have	yet	to	be	researched	in-depth.	Satire	has	shown	to	produce	a	variety	of	unique	responses,	therefore	by	broadening	the	spectrum	of	researched	political	satire	programs	we	will	have	a	better	understanding	on	the	political	implications	of	satire.	Future	research	could	also	rely	upon	different	measures	of	affective	
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 polarization,	such	as	open-ended	responses	to	prompts	or	a	wider	array	of	social	distance	questions.			
Implications		 Building	off	past	research,	this	project	helped	to	shed	more	light	on	the	cognitive	responses	to	complex	satire,	causes	of	affective	polarization,	and	the	impact	of	partisanship.	Colbert’s	style	of	satire	proved	to	be	ambiguous	based	on	partisanship	of	the	viewer,	thus	resulting	in	varied	interpretations	and	responses	to	his	messages.	SN’s	standing	in	the	media	sphere	places	it	on	a	fine	line	between	news	and	entertainment,	a	factor	which	allows	its	viewers	to	orient	the	program	as	they	wish.	As	a	result	of	being	able	to	be	viewed	under	different	orientations,	the	effects	of	SN	programs	are	more	varied	based	upon	orientation.			 In	looking	at	which	SN	viewing	effects	are	most	influences	by	partisanship	and	orientation,	I	focused	most	on	affective	polarization	as	it	is	an	extremely	influential	contemporary	political	issue	that	has	been	associated	with	the	viewing	of	political	media.	Specifically,	partisan	media	has	proven	to	influence	affective	polarization;	however,	when	the	partisan	bias	of	a	political	media	source	is	more	ambiguous,	ulterior	viewing	factors	begin	to	play	important	roles	in	the	deciphering	of	these	media	sources	and	the	responses	they	produce.	By	controlling	the	pre-exposure	orientation	of	different	partisans,	I	was	able	to	demonstrate	how	Colbert’s	style	of	political	satire	could	produce	a	wide	array	of	affective	responses,	especially	amongst	conservatives.			 	 		
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Appendix	A:	Survey	
 
Thank you for your interest in this study! If you decide to participate, you will be asked to read 
view a short clip and to answer several questions. All in all, the study should take between 6-7 
minutes to complete.  
 
The data collected for the study will be used to write a scholarly paper, which may be published 
in an academic journal. There are no risks associated with participation in this research. 
You will be paid $0.75 for completing this study. To receive your payment, be sure answer all 
survey questions and to copy the validation code you receive at the end of the study and to 
submit it in MTurk. 
 
By advancing to the next screen, you consent to participate in the study and you indicate that you 
have read and understood the above information. 
 
 
Q1 How old are you?  
________________________________________________________________	
 
	
 
Q2 What is your Race? 
o White  (1)  
o Black  (2)  
o American Indian or Alaska Native  (3)  
o Asian  (4)  
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  (5)  
o Other  (6) ________________________________________________ 
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Q3 What is your gender?  
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Transgender  (3)  
o Other  (4)  
o No Answer  (5)  
 
	
 
Q5 What is your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months? 
o Less Than $25,000  (1)  
o $25,000 - $34,999  (2)  
o $35,000 - $49,999  (3)  
o $50,000 - $74,999  (4)  
o $75,000 - $99,999  (5)  
o $100,000 - $149,999  (6)  
o More than $150,000  (7)  
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Q6 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received? 
o Less than High School  (1)  
o High school graduate - high school diploma or equivalent (for example: GED),  (2)  
o Some college but no degree, Associate degree (for example: Occupational/vocational 
program or Academic program),  (3)  
o Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA, AB, BS),  (4)  
o Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA),  (5)  
o Professional School degree (for example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD), Doctorate degree 
(for example: PhD, EdD),  (6)  
 
	
 
Q13 In which state do you currently reside? 
▼	Alabama	(1)	...	I	do	not	reside	in	the	United	States	(53)	
 
	
 
Q14 Which option best describes your past exposure to The Colbert Report or other satirical 
news programs like The Daily Show, or Last Week Tonight? 
o Frequently  (1)  
o Quite Often  (2)  
o Sometimes   (3)  
o Rarely  (4)  
o Never  (5)  
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Q15 Please indicate how your view The Colbert Report in terms of being either a news or 
entertainment program.  
	 Strictly	
News	
Mostly	
News		
Mix	of	News	
and	
Entertainment		
Mostly	
Entertainment		
Strictly	
Entertainment		
 
	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
 
Orientation	of	The	Colbert	Report	(1)	
	
 
 
	
 
Q31 Which of the following best describes your partisan identification? 
o Strong Republican  (1)  
o Republican  (2)  
o Weak Republican  (3)  
o Independent  (4)  
o Weak Democrat  (5)  
o Democrat  (6)  
o Strong Democrat  (7)  
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Q32 Which of the following best describes your political ideology?  
o Very Conservative  (1)  
o Conservative  (2)  
o Moderately Conservative  (3)  
o Moderate  (4)  
o Moderately Liberal  (5)  
o Liberal  (6)  
o Very Liberal  (7)  
 
 
Directive 1:  Please watch this entertaining clip from The Colbert Report, be prepared to 
evaluate Colbert’s performance after the clip 
 
	
 
Directive 2: Please watch this informative clip from The Colbert Report, be prepared to take a 
knowledge test after the clip 
 
	
 
Directive 3: Please watch this clip from The Colbert Report 
 
 
 
Q17 Where was the Obama vacationing when he asked an ambassador to have a dinner party? 
o Key West  (1)  
o London  (2)  
o Rome  (3)  
o Beijing  (4)  
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Q18 What event does Fox News critique Obama for ignoring while on vacation? 
o Tax Bill Vote   (1)  
o Supreme Court Ruling   (2)  
o US/Mexico Border Dispute  (3)  
o International Leader Summit in Europe   (4)  
 
	
 
Q20 Please rate how funny you found Stephen Colbert to be 
o Very Funny   (1)  
o Mildly Funny   (2)  
o Neither Funny or Unfunny  (3)  
o Not very Funny  (4)  
o Not Funny at all  (5)  
 
	
 
Q21 Please rate how entertaining you found the clip to be 
o Very Entertaining   (1)  
o Mildly Entertaining   (2)  
o Neither Entertaining or Unentertaining  (3)  
o Not very entertaining   (4)  
o Not entertaining at all   (5)  
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Q23 Please respond to the following scenarios  
 
	
 
Q24 I would be comfortable with my child or a close family member marrying someone from an 
opposing political party 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
	
 
Q25 When establishing friendships, I take into account the partisanship of potential friends 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q26 Please rate your feelings about the following prompts on a 1-100 scale along the 
thermometer, with 100 being a strong positive feeling and 0 being a strong negative feeling  
 
	
 
Q27 How do you feel about.... 
	 0	 10	 20	 30	 40	 50	 60	 70	 80	 90	 100	
 
The	actions	of	President	Obama	(1)	
	
The	critique	from	the	Fox	News	hosts	(2)	
	
The	coverage	of	the	debate	by	Stephen	Colbert	
(3)	 	
 
 	
